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Cultivating Perception: Phenomenological Encounters
with Artworks
Helen A. Fielding
P henomenally strong artworks have the potential to anchor us in theworld and to cultivate our perception. For the most part, we barelynotice the world around us, as we are too often elsewhere, texting,
coordinating schedules, planning ahead, navigating what needs to be done.
This is the level of our age that shapes the ways we encounter the world and
others.1 In such a world it is no wonder we no longer trust our senses. But
as feminists have long argued, thinking grounded in embodied experience
is more open to difference and helps us to resist the colonization of a singu-
lar, only seemingly neutral, perspective that closes down living potentialities.
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1 Mariana Ortega ð2001Þ extends Martin Heidegger’s understanding of world to worlds.
But here I refer to a dominant world that casts its shadow over multiple worlds.
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I want to show how a phenomenological approach that draws on embodied
perception has much to offer feminist engagements with art.
Recognition of feminist phenomenology as a movement itself is relatively
recent.2 Despite a reliance on embodied experience as well as a mediation
between the material and subjective, twentieth-century feminists were crit-
ical of phenomenologists for universalizing a European, able-bodied male
subject, or for assuming the transcendental subject, the pure ego, which
allowed them to relegate differences such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity,
ability, and class to everyday empirical differences that belong to the social
sciences ðFisher 2000, 2010, 85; Heina¨maa and Rodemeyer 2010, 1–3Þ.
But more recently, feminists have recognized the important possibilities of
a methodology that reveals embodied engagement with things, people,
and relations. At the same time, they have also made signiﬁcant methodo-
logical interventions, investigating, for example, what happens when we be-
gin with the assumption that embodied lived experience structures the re-
ﬂective process itself. This intervention enables them to ask how social,
cultural, and corporeal differences actually shift the ways in which the world
is understood, the ways in which it becomes meaningful. Gail Weiss, for ex-
ample, explores how these differences organize meaning in terms of hori-
zons that provide the “unthematized background context that structures
daily life” ð2008, 2Þ. Other feminists also explore the ways in which tempo-
rality—that is, duration, habituation, and sedimented experience—shape the
ego.3 Still others, as I do here, draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s method-
ology to show that it is not only that reﬂection rests upon and is shaped by
lived embodied experiences: the body itself has its own ways of understand-
ing and interpreting the world.4 In other words, there is a need to recog-
nize the primacy of embodied perception that underlies cognition. The
dismissal by some of the political potency of art belongs, I would argue,
to the refusal to recognize this primacy of perception ðMerleau-Ponty 2012Þ;
its conﬁnement to designated spaces is a way of controlling its power.5
Importantly, for feminist phenomenologists, bringing to view the ways in
which we understand and interpret our lived existence and world, so that we
can reﬂect upon them, opens up possibilities for change. For Linda Martı´n
Alcoff, for example, describing the ways in which race, though not a biologi-
2 Fisher ð2000Þ is considered the ﬁrst naming of this ﬁeld.
3 These feminists engage largely with EdmundHusserl, considered the founder of twentieth-
century phenomenology. See, e.g., Al-Saji ð2010Þ andHeina¨maa andRodemeyer ð2010Þ.
4 See Weiss ð1999Þ, Ahmed ð2006Þ, Rawlinson ð2006Þ, and Fielding ð2011Þ.
5 This move works in tandem with a similar one to associate the body, the feminine, and the
exotized, erotized, and racialized other together in a binary relation with the mind, the mas-
culine, and the European.
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cal category, is still real allows her to address how a “postural body image or
a habitual perception” can be reoriented through critical phenomenological
description ð2006, 194Þ. Racialized perception belongs to the imposition of
representations and structures on our encounters with others, which means
we do not actually engage with who or what is there. The “we” I refer to is
a general “we” that belongs to a dominant world and coexists with partic-
ular worlds sometimes paradoxically and often painfully.6
There is plenty of evidence that even those of us who consider ourselves
not to be racist or sexist engage in implicit bias.7 We move into and take up
this shared world’s generalities, its dominant ways of moving, perceiving,
and corporeally understanding, even if we also resist them. There is, more-
over, a tendency to remain largely unaware of this phenomenon since the
forgetting of embodied perception belongs to this age. Feminist phenome-
nological approaches address this forgetting by exploring the ways in which
the world becomes meaningful, with world understood as both our partic-
ular and shared experiences of a web of material, discursive, affective, and
sensual relationalities.
For this reason, artworks that rely on embodied encounters lend them-
selves to a feminist phenomenological approach. Brian Jungen’s artwork,
People’s Flag, is one such work. When I ﬁrst encountered it at London’s
Tate Modern, entering the gallery where it was hung, I was mesmerized by
the vastness of the red swath of material suspended from the ceiling and
folded on to the ﬂoor, providing a red glow against the white walls.8 If I
had simply glanced at the ﬂag and then exited the hall, I would have been
left with an impression of immense redness. But my companion and I tar-
ried a while, examining the details of the ﬂag composed of multiple pieces
of worn clothing, sewn together by hand.9 As we spent time with the work,
6 Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Weiss describes the anonymous body as a kind of nonre-
ﬂective intentionality that guides our daily interactions, which is not the same as imposing the
universalized body of the male European philosopher. Weiss notes that the anonymous body
is not general since it is always taken up in particularized situations ðWeiss 2002, 192–94Þ.
Nonetheless, Mary C. Rawlinson ð2006Þ also points out the contradiction in Merleau-Ponty’s
“we,” since it both imposes a historically and conceptually based privilegedEuropeanmasculine
subject, even as Merleau-Ponty espouses the contingency and situatedness of all ideas and
experiences.
7 See, e.g., Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke ð1999Þ.
8 Jungen is a Canadian artist with a Swiss-born father and an indigenous mother who was a
member of the Dane-zaa Nation ðsee http://www.gallery.ca/en/see/collections/artwork
.php?mkey5188487Þ. I saw the work, which was made for the Tate Modern in June 2006, at
both the Tate Modern and Museum London in Canada.
9 My companion was Mary Rawlinson, whom I thank for her contributions to this dis-
cussion from our postconference museum visit. I have encountered the work since atMuseum
London in Canada.
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something wondrous began to happen. The uniformity of the red disap-
peared, and the individual pieces of clothing— shirts, hats, skirts, vests, bags,
umbrellas—began to pop out in a multitude of variations of reds, browns,
pinks, and oranges. After a while, rather than seeing an enormous swath of
red material, we encountered a sea of differences, of distinct colors and
shapes of garments worn by different bodies, joined together by a web of
stitches. We had moved into the level of the work and were seeing accord-
ing to it.10
Levels, as Merleau-Ponty shows us, are established by situations we en-
ter, and they tend to retreat into the background once our bodies adjust
ð2012, 253–62Þ. For example, our eyes move into and adjust to a new
lighting level as we move from a poorly lit space to a bright one. Besides
the particular levels we move into and take up by virtue of being embod-
ied, we also inhabit, I would argue, a more general epochal level that priv-
ileges efﬁciency and calculation as well as, for example, racialized, sexist,
and heteronormative understandings of the world. But People’s Flag es-
tablishes its own level according to which viewers perceive. As Merleau-
Ponty claims, when we encounter an artwork we do not so much look at
the work as perceive “according to” it; the work can open us to new per-
spectives and worlds that are not our own, or deepen our understanding of
the world or worlds in which we live ð1964, 164Þ. Because we always move
from one level to the next, we bring levels with us along with our embod-
ied histories, which shape the ways we encounter the new. I, for exam-
ple, brought with me my own particular experiences as a white feminist
academic, including the sedimentation of the artworks with which I have
previously engaged. If I had been British, my understanding of the his-
tory of the work, which I will shortly address, would likely have been
deeper. Nonetheless, one does not need the full history in order to en-
counter the work as a material object, although the closer one is to its
cultural speciﬁcity, the more likely it will resonate deeply.
Accordingly, artworks can make a difference politically when they so
ground us. Perceiving according to the work moves us away from being a
subject who stands back and assesses an aesthetic object. The artwork be-
comes a kind of participation in the material, signiﬁcatory, sensible, and af-
fective texture of the real, creatively contributing to opening up this texture
or fabric in new ways and helping us to rethink what we mean by reality.
Indeed, the ﬂag can itself be understood as a texture, a fabric, or a tissue
of the world.11 Of course, artworks are usually set up in museums and gal-
10 I draw on the body hermeneutics of Samuel B. Mallin ð1996Þ.
11 Merleau-Ponty uses the word “ﬂesh” to refer to this fabric or tissue that is both material
and imbued by imagination, signiﬁcation ð1968, 123, 138, 140, 144Þ.
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leries to be looked at and framed by curatorial discourses, often impeding
phenomenal encounters, though this potential to guide us to perceive and
think in new ways remains.12
In his posthumously publishedwork,TheVisible and the Invisible ð1968Þ,
Merleau-Ponty muses on this fabric of the real in a meditation on the color
red. Indeed, my reading of this passage intertwined with my experience of
Jungen’s work; the colors of red that Jungen chose for his artwork are, as
Merleau-Ponty describes it, variants in relation to their surroundings ð1968,
132Þ. Each piece of red cloth appears through the ﬁbers of the material,
connecting it with the other reds around it; colors attract, dominate, repel,
intertwine—the visible itself is shown to be a web of relations that extends
beyond the interaction of colors and of the variants of red in the space of
the museum gallery, to the reds that belong to various cultures, to national
ﬂags, to religious symbols, to the embodied signiﬁcation of personal expe-
riences, indeed all the ways we have in the past experienced the color red,
with its attendant meanings, including, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “from the
depths of imaginary worlds.”13 Colors like these reds, then, are participa-
tions, relations between “exterior” and “interior horizons” that remain open
to change, “modulation½s of this world” ð1968, 132Þ. Jungen’s ﬂag thus
works to open up an interior temporal depth that both creates and en-
riches identity by resonating with and responding to past experiences as
the work is experienced in the present. Thus, People’s Flag is not merely a
collage of different reds; it shows up this fabric of the real, this intertwining
and overlapping of the visible with the invisible, the overlapping of the
visible pieces of clothing with the bodies that inhabited them, that made
and cared for them. For, as Merleau-Ponty points out, red is always a red
something—colors are always intertwined with texture, shape, size, and the
identity of the object.
Thus, Jungen’s People’s Flag shows us how the weft of the real not only
relies on the material world but also weaves materiality together with ideas,
signiﬁcation, perception, affect, and living bodies. It allows us to experi-
ence how to move from the general concept of red ﬂag to the particular-
ities of experienced material redness that support that concept and also
break it apart. The work shows us difference coming into appearance if we
attend to it. Flags normally accompany national identities that carry with
12 There are of course signiﬁcant efforts to counter this tendency of conﬁning artworks to
museums and galleries.
13 Indeed, when People’s Flag was shown in the National Museum of the American Indian
in Washington, DC, this venue apparently prompted some to interpret the work in terms of the
US “ﬂag of a united Red Nation of Indian people,” a concept that would not have been part
of Jungen’s Canadian upbringing. See Gopnik ð2009Þ.
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them histories of inclusions and exclusions; Jungen, as an indigenous artist,
is well aware of North America’s settler colonialism that elides the history
of First Nations peoples through a series of exclusions, including cultural dev-
astation as well as genocide ðMorgensen 2011Þ. Though this work does not
take up an indigenous theme as such, this history likely inﬂects both the
artist’s practice as well as some viewers’ encounters with the work.
Flags work to unify and shape identities. Jungen’s ﬂag phenomenally
shows up the differences that support identities—differences that are partic-
ular, material, sensual—differences that must be attended to over time in
order to appear. In that the alterity established in the work takes time to en-
counter, it further contributes to opening up my own interior temporal
depths.14 Corporeal perception slows things down. It takes time to move
into the level of the work, to run one’s eyes along and to walk about the
length of the fabric. Thus, the ﬂag only comes into appearance gradually as
one moves into the work’s level, showing the viewer how underneath mass
generalizations, identities, and national groupings that might appear as uni-
ﬁed, the perceptual lived world is extraordinarily diverse. For a short while,
if the viewer can leave behind the dominant level of our age, of planning
and reckoning, she can experience the multiple particularities of difference
that also intertwine with shared generalities like redness. Moreover, since
perception is sedimented over time, we are addressed by works that attract
or repel our gaze. Within the work itself, I am perceptually drawn to some
garments more than others. The work thus engages each viewer both more
generally in terms of its level and more particularly with the viewer’s en-
gagement with the speciﬁcities of the fabrics that makes up the whole. At
the same time, it also reminds us conceptually that from a certain distance
and speed that excludes duration, situation, and movement—that is, the en-
counter—humans can appear under a unifying banner that obscures their
particularities.
As Dorothea Olkowski explains, the dynamical system of classical phys-
ics that underlies much of Western thinking prioritizes space over time.
The real is given to us through projections of “mathematical and physical
structures” whereby “space and time are given, not emergent” ðOlkowski
2012, 85, 121Þ. In classical physics time appears according to spatial param-
eters as a sequence of moments, and space in terms of things side by side.
In this framework there is no room for encounters. If space is calculably mea-
14 Here I draw on Rawlinson’s description of contact with alterity opening up the viewer’s
own interior temporal depths. She shows how literature allows the reader to come into contact
with embodied essences or styles of being that are not her own—something that philosophy is
not able to achieve since it draws on a shared and common language that does not open to
difference ð2006, 76–79Þ.
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surable, then nearness and distance can be accordingly reckoned, and every-
thing becomes equally available; there is no difference. Although it is a system
that is apparently endless or inﬁnite, because encounters are not possible,
it is ultimately closed, providing only more of the same. It is not the same
as situations experienced by living bodies where the structure provided by
the milieu allows for inexhaustible possibilities and an indeterminate future.
If we remain within the “cognitive-linguistic realm of existence,” we can
inhabit a system that is limited only by the inﬁnite possibilities of human
creativity, which can be both extraordinary and atrocious ðArendt 1958Þ.15
Jungen’s work calls viewers to attend to the intricate and time-
consuming labor involved in weaving together each article of clothing,
a process that takes time and a task Jungen shared with others. For, just
as vision is itself an intertwining of visible and invisible elements, so too
does my vision intertwine synaesthetically with other senses, in this case,
predominantly with touch. As my eyes run across the texture of the ﬂag,
I can almost feel the textures of the materials I see; my hands know the
softness of wool, the smoothness of vinyl. Though touching the work is
prohibited in this museum space, my hands are drawn to the fabrics, sub-
tly reversing the priority of vision over touch even as the two senses inher-
ently overlap. This intertwining of vision and touch helps me to see that
each piece was individually stitched into the whole—and though People’s
Flag is composed of mostly mass-produced garments, the pieces bear the
particularity of each body that wore them, reminding us as well of the in-
visible work of each particular laborer involved in the production of the
mass-produced clothing that provides the material of the ﬂag, as well as
the garments we wear.
Thus, the encounter with the work is inherently temporal and spatial—
the looking and walking around the piece, the making of the work, the
wearing of the articles of clothing, repeatedly over time, the repetitive mo-
tion in conﬁned spaces required of the laborers, the place for which it was
made, for Jungen made this work for the Tate Modern, which is itself a
converted factory.16 Thus, it is not surprising that viewers are also reminded
of the speciﬁcity of place. The work is in fact an homage to England’s his-
tory of “popular protest and to England’s left” ðGopnik 2009Þ.
Indeed, we know from Karl Marx that the alienation of labor from the
products of consumption contributes to commodity fetishism, whereby
15 The cognitive-linguistic realm of existence is Mallin’s ð1996, 275–76Þ term for what is
usually understood as mind, set in opposition to body, which is understood as perception,
affective-sociality, and motility.
16 Importantly, there is no museum entrance fee, and the room where the work hung
lies just inside the main entrance.
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labor is obscured under an idea or value imposed from without. Jungen’s
work calls us to recognize our responsibility to the individuals’ hands that
produce the products we wear and consume, even as this labor is part of
the invisible fabric of the ﬂag that shows up in the traces of the stitches
and that precedes our active perception of the articles of clothing themselves.
His work weaves this experience into the attentive viewer’s own embodied
fabric. Moreover, though this piece is not at ﬁrst obviously gendered, we
cannot ignore the fact that the labor harnessed for mass-produced clothing is
predominantly female and that textile production as an art practice has also
been associated for the most part with women, and hence, until recently,
largely undervalued. Through this artwork, we are brought back in touch
with, and called to reﬂect upon, this meaningful material world.
Accordingly, People’s Flag calls the viewer to reﬂect upon the ways we
currently produce, buy, and wear clothing, as well as upon what it means
to belong to a community of differences. In the way Alcoff ð2006Þ sug-
gests, the work allows for phenomenological description by providing the
viewer with the opportunity to reﬂect upon her habits of perception. For
experience on its own is not sufﬁcient to enact change. We also need to
reﬂect upon that which we experience; otherwise, we risk simply appro-
priating sensations, colors, beauty into our embodied being without ques-
tioning or acknowledging, as Luce Irigaray describes it, who or what has
contributed to who we are, opening us to repeating the colonizing and ap-
propriating gaze ðIrigaray 2004Þ.
If we are to take feminist criticism of phenomenology seriously, then we
have to consider the extent to which sedimented meaning structures impose
themselves upon that which we perceive. But artworks can counter habitual
ways of perceiving, opening up our embodied perception and showing us
how to perceive in new ways, including how to encounter difference. Phe-
nomenally we are not locked in our own unique worlds. As Irigaray writes,
we see differently when we look at something with someone else ð2004,
399Þ. Coperception of an artwork reveals how we confront, are shaped, and
moved by an autonomous material reality even as we bring our own indi-
vidual histories and worlds to that encounter.17 On that day at the Tate
Modern, I shared my experience of Jungen’s artwork with my companion.
Through her gaze I perceived differently. To cultivate perception is to be
attentive to the here and now so that it emerges as a shared reality, which
entails acknowledging a rich web of perceptions, affects, meanings, horizons,
and experiences with all its potential. Indeed, the perceptual meanings we
17 Linda Fisher emphasizes the materiality that sometimes gets lost under all the socio-
cultural and symbolic representations ðFisher 2010, 88Þ.
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arrive at are more compelling when they are shared, relational, and acknowl-
edged by others—and they have the potential to challenge imposed ideas like
those of the uniﬁed and boundaried nation-states that ﬂags represent.
It is my claim that shifting the ways we encounter the world as embodied
beings, deepening and attending to our perceptual engagement with what
and who is there, can initiate change. Since thought itself is always corpo-
real and situated, artworks can help to guide us in this task. Indeed, even
though an encounter with Jungen’s artwork is limited since it is displayed
in a museum, just as Jungen creates a work that engages in the fabric of red,
it does not need to be seen by all to become part of a cultural generality.
So, too, in engaging with the artwork myself, I bring the deepening of
my own perceptual capacities to my relations with others who may never
have the opportunity to encounter the artwork themselves. Ultimately,
to change reality, we need to know where we are in order to decide what
action to take. Some artworks can help to cultivate our perception and to
bring embodied being to our thinking.
Department of Women’s Studies and Feminist Research and Department
of Philosophy
University of Western Ontario
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Embodied Worlds and Situated Bodies: Feminism,
Phenomenology, Film Theory
Jenny Chamarette
I n his antimanifesto of cultural phenomenology, Steven Connor pointsout the potential failings of a purely phenomenological approach: that byattempting to describe the phenomena of the world in intimate detail,
phenomenology risks normalizing that world rather than subjecting it to
critique; that it is depoliticized and thus inadequate; that it is dehistori-
cized and transcendental and thus fails to account for the lived situation
of the world, its subjects, and its objects. But he also argues that the phe-
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